We present a polyhedral description of kernels in orientations of line multigraphs. Given a directed multigraph D, let σ(D) denote the linear system consisting of domination, independence and nonnegativity constraints, and let F K(D) denote the set of all solutions to
Introduction
An undirected graph is called simple if it contains neither loops nor parallel edges and is called a multigraph if parallel edges are allowed. Simple digraphs and directed multigraphs are defined analogously.
Let G be an undirected graph. The line graph of G, denoted by L(G), is an undirected graph that represents the adjacency of edges of G: each vertex of L(G) corresponds to an edge of G, and two vertices of L(G) are adjacent if and only if they are incident as edges in G. We call L(G) the line multigraph of G if any two vertices of L(G) are connected by as many edges as the number of their common ends in G.
Let D = (V, A) be a digraph. For U ⊆ V , we call U an independent set of D if no two vertices in U are connected by an arc, call U a dominating set of D if for each vertex v ∈ U , there is an arc from v to U , and call U a kernel of D if it is both independent and dominating. We call D kernel perfect if each of its induced subgraphs has a kernel. A clique of D is a subset of V such that any two vertices are connected by an arc. We call D clique-acyclic if for each clique of D the induced subdigraph of one-way arcs is acyclic, and call D good if it is clique-acyclic and every directed odd cycle has a chord or a pseudochord 1 . Theorem 1.1 (Borodin et al. [3] ). Let G be a line multigraph. The orientation D of G is kernel perfect if and only if it is good.
A subset P of R n is called a polytope if it is the convex hull of finitely many vectors in R n .
A point x in P is called a vertex or an extreme point if there exist no distinct points y and z in P such that x = αy + (1 − α)z for 0 < α < 1. It is well known that P is the convex hull of its vertices, and that there exists a linear system Ax ≤ b such that P = {x ∈ R n : Ax ≤ b}.
We say P is 1/k-integral if its vertices are 1/k-integral vectors, where k ∈ N. By a theorem in linear programming, P is 1/k-integral if and only if max{c T x : Ax ≤ b} has an optimal 1/k-integral solution for every integral vector c for which the optimum is finite. If, instead, max{c T x : Ax ≤ b} has a dual optimal 1/k-integral solution, we say Ax ≤ b is totally dual 1/k-integral (TDI/k). It is easy to verify that Ax ≤ b is TDI/k if and only if Bx ≤ b is TDI, where B = A/k and k ∈ N. Thus from a theorem of Edmonds and Giles [6] , we deduce that if Ax ≤ b is TDI/k and b is integal, then P = {x ∈ R n : Ax ≤ b} is 1/k-integral.
Let σ(D) denote the linear system consisting of the following inequalities: 
As described in Egres Open [1] , the polyhedral description of kernels remains open. Chen et al. [4] attained a polyhedral characterization of kernels by replacing clique constraints x(Q) ≤ 1 for Q ∈ Q with independence constraints x(u) + x(v) ≤ 1 for (u, v) ∈ A. In this paper we show that kernels in digraph D can be fully characterized by polyhedral approaches if D is an orientation of line multigraphs. 
The equivalence of (i) and (ii) was established by Borodin et al. [3] (Maffray [8] proved the case when the underlying undirected graph of D is perfect). Király and Pap [7] proved the theorem when the underlying undirected graph of D is the line graph of a bipartite graph, which will be described in the next section. Our result strengthens the theorem of Borodin et al. [3] and generalizes the theorem of Király and Pap [7] to line multigraphs.
Preliminaries
Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph. For v ∈ V , let δ(v) denote the set of all edges incident to v and ≺ v be a strict linear order on δ(v). We call ≺ v the preference of v, and for edges e and f incident to v we say v prefers e to f or e dominates f if e v f . Let ≺ be the set of all ≺ v for v ∈ V . We call (G, ≺) a preference system and say (G, ≺) is simple if G is simple. For e ∈ E, let ϕ(e) denote the set of all edges that dominate e in (G, ≺). Let M be a matching of G. We say M is stable in (G, ≺) if every edge of G is dominated by some edge in M .
Let π(G, ≺) denote the linear system consisting of the following inequalites:
1)
2)
As observed by Abeledo and Rothblum [2] , incidence vectors of stable matchings of (G, ≺)
are precisely integral solutions x ∈ Z E to π(G, ≺). The stable matching polytope, denoted by
, is the convex hull of incidence vectors of all stable matchings of (G, ≺). The fractional stable matching polytope, denoted by F SM (G, ≺), is the set of all solutions x ∈ R E to π(G, ≺).
Theorem 2.1 (Rothblum [9] ). Let (G, ≺) be a simple preference system. If G is bipartite, then
Theorem 2.2 (Király and Pap [7] ). Let (G, ≺) be a simple preference system. If G is bipartite, then π(G, ≺) is totally dual integral.
. . , l, where indices are taken modulo
denote the set of all edges with x(e) = α where α ∈ R and E + (x) denote the set of all edges with x(e) > 0.
Theorem 2.3 (Abeledo and Rothblum [2]
). Let (G, ≺) be a simple preference system. Then
consists of vertex disjoint cycles with cyclic preferences.
Reductions
To study kernels in directed multigraphs, it suffices to work on its minimal spanning subdigraph that preserves all the connection relations of vertices. In the remainder of this section, assume 
• complete subgraphs of H induced on three vertices (with parallel edges allowed).
Hence constraints (1.2) can be viewed as constraints (2.2) together with some extra constraints on (H, ≺). Let O(H) denote the set of all complete subgraphs of H induced on three vertices.
Then σ(D) can be reformulated in terms of preference system (H, ≺):
3)
Notice that constraints (3.1), (3.2) and (3.5) constitute the Rothblum system π(H, ≺) which defines F SM (H, ≺). Constraints (3.3) are redundant with respect to π(H, ≺) due to constraints (3.2). As we shall see, constraints (3.4) are also redundant with respect to π(H, ≺) when D is good. Hence F K(D) is essentially defined by Rothblum system π(H, ≺), or equivalently, that
Lemma 3.1. For parallel edges e and e ′ in H, there exists no edge f such that
where v is a common end of e and e ′ .
Proof. Since D is clique-acyclic, by the construction of preference system (H, ≺), the lemma follows directly.
By Lemma 3.1, parallel edges play the same role in preference system (H, ≺). Hence we turn to study underlying simple preference systems of (H, ≺). Let (Ĥ,≺) be a simple preference system, whereĤ is a spanning subgraph of H obtained by keeping one edge between every pair of adjacent vertices and≺ is the restriction of ≺ onĤ. Before proceeding, we introduce a technical lemma.
be two linear systems, whereĀ is obtained from A by duplicating some columns. If (3.6) is totally dual 1/k-integral, then so is (3.7), where k ∈ N.
Proof. It suffices to prove that the theorem holds forĀ with one duplicate column. Letx =
, where a k is the kth column of A. Let c = (c 1 , . . . ,c n+1 ) ∈ Z n+1 be an integral vector such that max{c Tx :Āx ≤ b,x ≥ 0} is finite.
We claim that equality always holds in this inequality. Given an optimal solutionx * to max{ĉ Tx :
It is easy to verify thatx * is a feasible solution to max{c Tx :Āx ≤ b,x ≥ 0}. Moreover,ĉ Tx * =c Tx * implies max{ĉ Tx : Ax ≤ b,x ≥ 0} ≤ max{c Tx :Āx ≤ b,x ≥ 0}. Hence equality follows.
Since Ax ≤ b is TDI/k, there exists a dual optimal 1/k-integral solution y * to max{ĉ Tx :
implying that y * is a feasible dual solution to max{c Tx :Āx ≤ b,x ≥ 0}. By the following
y * is also a dual optimal solution to max{c Tx :Āx ≤ b,x ≥ 0}, where the last inequality is from the weak duality theorem. Hence the lemma follows. Proof. For simplicity, assume that H = (V, E) andĤ = (V,Ê).
We prove the "only if" part by showing that F SM (Ĥ,≺) is a projection of F SM (H, ≺). Let
x be a point in F SM (Ĥ,≺) and define x := (x, 0) ∈ RÊ ×R E−Ê . To show that x ∈ F SM (H, ≺), it suffices to prove that x(ϕ(e)) ≥ 1 for e ∈ E −Ê. Let e ′ ∈Ê be the edge parallel with e ∈ E −Ê. By Lemma 3.1, x(ϕ(e)) = x(ϕ(e ′ )) =x(ϕ(e ′ )) ≥ 1. Hence F SM (Ĥ,≺) is a projection of F SM (H, ≺).
We prove the "if" part by showing that each vertex of F SM (H, ≺) can be obtained from some vertex of F SM (Ĥ,≺) by adding some zero entries. Let x be a vertex of F SM (H, ≺). We first
show that x(e)·x(e ′ ) = 0 for parallel edges e and e ′ . Assume to the contrary that x(e)·x(e ′ ) = 0, then x(e) = x(e ′ ) = 1/2 follows. Let y and z be duplicates of x, and further set y(e) := z(e ′ ) := 1 and y(e ′ ) := z(e) := 0. It follows that x = (y + z)/2. Clearly, y, z ∈ F SM (H, ≺), contradicting to the fact that x is a vertex. Now definex ∈ RÊ by, for e ∈Ê,x(e) := x(e) + x(e ′ ), where e ′ ∈ E −Ê is parallel with e. By Lemma 3.1, it is easy to verify thatx ∈ F SM (Ĥ,≺). We claim thatx is a vertex of F SM (Ĥ,≺). Assume to the contrary that there existx 1 ,x 2 ∈ F SM (Ĥ,≺) such thatx = αx 1 + (1 − α)x 2 , where 0 < α < 1. For i = 1, 2, we extendx i ∈ RÊ to x i ∈ R E by, for e ∈Ê without parallel edges in H, x i (e) :=x i (e); for e ∈Ê and its parallel edge e ′ ∈ E −Ê, if x(e) > x(e ′ ), x i (e) :=x i (e) and x i (e ′ ) := 0, otherwise x i (e) := 0 and x i (e ′ ) :=x i (e). By Lemma 3.1, it is easy to see that x 1 , x 2 ∈ F SM (H, ≺). Since x(e) · x(e ′ ) = 0 for parallel edges e and e ′ , x = αx 1 + (1 − α)x 2 follows, a contradiction. Hencex is vertex of F SM (Ĥ,≺).
Therefore each vertex x of F SM (H, ≺) is associated with a vertexx of F SM (Ĥ,≺), and x can be obtained fromx by, for e ∈Ê without parallel edges in H, x(e) :=x(e); for e ∈Ê and its parallel edge e ′ ∈ E −Ê, if x(e) > x(e ′ ), x(e) :=x(e) and x(e ′ ) := 0, otherwise x(e) := 0 and
x(e ′ ) :=x(e).
We end this section with a summary. When D is clique-acyclic, it is associated with a preference system (H, ≺) and a simple preference system (Ĥ,≺), whereĤ is a simple spanning subgraph of H maximizing the edge set and≺ is the restriction of ≺ onĤ. Hence constraints 
Proofs
Before presenting our proof of the main theorem, we exhibit some properties of simple preference systems admitting no odd cycles with cyclic preferences.
Lemma 4.1. Let (G, ≺) be a simple preference system. If (G, ≺) admits no odd cycles with cyclic preferences, then SM (G, ≺) = F SM (G, ≺).
As observed by Chen et al. [5] , integrality of F SM (G, ≺) is equivalent to total dual integrality of π(G, ≺), where (G, ≺) is a simple preference system. A corollary follows directly. For i = 1, 2, . . . , r, label vertices and edges of
e i k+1 for k = 1, 2, . . . , l, where e i k = v i k v i k+1 and indices are taken modulo l. We remark that the parity of vertices and edges refers to the parity of their indices. Define z ∈ R E(G) by
e is an even edge in some C ∈ E 1/2 (x), −1 e is an odd edge in some C ∈ E 1/2 (x), 0 otherwise. Case 1. Edge e is an edge from some C ∈ E 1/2 (x). This case is trivial since C admits cyclic preferences.
Case 2. Edge e is a chord in some C ∈ E 1/2 (x). We first show that endpoints of e have different parity in C. We prove it by contradiction. Without loss of generality, let e = v 2i v 2j .
If e 2i ≺ e, then e 2i−1 ≺ e. Since x(ϕ(e)) = 1, it follows that e ≺ e 2j−1 and e ≺ e 2j . However, v 2i ev 2j e 2j v 2j+1 . . . v 2i−1 e 2i−1 v 2i consistute an odd cycle with cyclic preferences, a contradiction.
Hence e ≺ e 2i .
Similarly, if e 2j ≺ e, then e 2j−1 ≺ e. Eqaulity x(ϕ(e)) = 1 implies that e ≺ e 2i and e ≺ e 2i−1 . However, v 2i e 2i v 2i+1 . . . v 2j−1 e 2j−1 v 2j ev 2i constitute an odd cycle with cyclic preferences, a contradiction. Hence e ≺ e 2j . Now e ≺ e 2i and e ≺ e 2j , it follows that e 2i−1 ≺ e and e 2j−1 ≺ e since x(ϕ(e)) = 1. But in this case two odd cycles with cyclic preferences mentioned above occur at the same time.
Therefore, endpoints of e have different parity in C. Hence let e = v 2i v 2j+1 . If e 2i ≺ e (resp. e 2j+1 ≺ e), it follows that e 2i−1 ≺ e (resp. e 2j ≺ e). Then e is dominated by two consecutive edges from C, which is trivial. So assume that e ≺ e 2i and e ≺ e 2j+1 . Since x(ϕ(e)) = 1, it
follows that e 2i+1 ≺ e and e 2j ≺ e. Therefore e is dominated by two edges with different parity.
Case 3. Edge e is a hanging edge of some C ∈ E 1/2 (x) and dominated by two edges from C. This case is trivial.
Case 4. Edge e is a connecting edge bewteen C i and C j and dominated by one edge from C i and one edge from C j respectively, where C i , C j ∈ E 1/2 (x). For k = 1, 2, . . . , r, let F k be the subset of edges in this case and incident to C k . Then ∪ i=r i=1 F i ∪ C i induces a subgraph of G. It suffices to work on a component of the induced subgraph. We apply induction on the number α of cycles from E 1/2 (x) in a component.
When α = 1, it is trivial. Hence assume the claim holds for components with α ≥ 1 cycles from E 1/2 (x). We consider a component with α + 1 cycles C 1 , . . . , C α , C α+1 from E 1/2 (x).
Without loss of generality, assume that deleting C α+1 yields a new component with α cycles.
By induction hypothesis, the claim holds for the resulting component. It remains to check edges in F α+1 . If there exists an edge in F α+1 violating the claim, relabel vertices and edges in C α+1 .
After at most one relabeling, all edges in F α+1 satisfy the claim. We prove it by contradiction. Let f 1 , f 2 ∈ F α+1 be edges such that f 1 satisfies the claim but f 2 violates the claim. For i = 1, 2, let f i = u i w i , where u i is the endpoint in the resulting component and w i is the endpoint in C α+1 .
By assumption, u 1 and w 1 have different parity and u 2 and w 2 have the same parity. Analogous to the definition of cycles with cyclic preferences, we call path
Clearly, for any two vertices in the same component, there exists a path with linear preferences between them. Hence there exist a u 1 u 2 -path P α and a w 2 w 1 -path P α+1 , both of which admit linear preferences. Moreover, u 1 P α u 2 f 2 w 2 P α+1 w 1 f 1 u 1 constitute a cycle with cyclic preferences. We justify this cycle is odd by showing that the u 1 u 2 -path P α is even (resp. odd) if u 1 and u 2 have the same (resp. different) parity.
If u 1 and u 2 belong to the same cycle from E 1/2 (x), it is trivial. Hence assume u 1 ∈ C s and u 2 ∈ C t , where s, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , α} and s = t. We apply induction on the number τ of cycles from E 1/2 (x) involved in P α . Clearly, τ ≥ 2. When τ = 2. Take v s v t ∈ F s ∩ F t on P α . Let P s be the part of P α from u 1 to v s in C s and P t be the part of P α from v t to u 2 in C t . It follows that u 1 P s v s v t P t u 2 constitute P α . By primary induction hypothesis, v s and v t have different parity since v s v t ∈ F s ∩ F t . If u 1 and u 2 have the same parity, then P s and P t have different parity, implying that P α is even; if u 1 and u 2 have different parity, then P s and P t have the same parity, implying that P α is odd. Now assume τ ≥ 2. Let C k 1 , . . . , C kτ , C k τ +1 be cycles from
Let P s,kτ denote the part of P α from u 1 to v kτ and P kτ ,t denote the part of P α from v kτ to u 2 . Clearly, P α = u 1 P s,kτ v kτ P kτ ,t u 2 .
Since P s,kτ involves τ cycles and P kτ ,t involves two cycles, both length depend on the parity of endpoints. It follows that P α is even when u 1 and u 2 have the same parity, and P α is odd when u 1 and u 2 have different parity.
Hence when u 1 and u 2 have the same parity, w 1 and w 2 have different parity, implying that P α is even and P α+1 is odd; when u 1 and u 2 have different parity, w 1 and w 2 have the same parity, implying that P α is odd and P α+1 is even. Either case yields an odd cycle with cyclic preferences, a contradiction. 
